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Abstract
The question of addiction speci cally concerns (1), the process by which drug-taking behavior, in certain
individuals, evolves into compulsive patterns of drug-seeking and drug-taking behavior that take place at the
expense of most other activities and (2), the inability to cease drug-taking; the problem of relapse. In this
paper current biopsychological views of addiction are critically evaluated in light of the “incentive-
sensitization theory of addiction”, which we  rst proposed in 1993, and new developments in research are
incorporated. We argue that traditional negative reinforcement, positive reinforcement, and hedonic accounts
of addiction are neither necessary nor suf cient to account for compulsive patterns of drug-seeking and
drug-taking behavior. Four major tenets of the incentive-sensitization view are discussed. These are:
(1) Potentially addictive drugs share the ability to produce long-lasting adaptations in neural systems.
(2) The brain systems that are changed include those normally involved in the process of incentive motivation
and reward. (3) The critical neuroadaptations for addiction render these brain reward systems hypersensitive
(“sensitized”) to drugs and drug-associated stimuli. (4) The brain systems that are sensitized do not mediate
the pleasurable or euphoric effects of drugs (drug “liking”), but instead they mediate a subcomponent of
reward we have termed incentive salience (drug “wanting”). We also discuss the role that mesolimbic
dopamine systems play in reward, evidence that neural sensitization happens in humans, and the implications
of incentive-sensitization for the development of therapies in the treatment of addiction.
Introduction
In thinking about the problem of addiction, and
the development of animal models of addiction,
it is important to remember that at some time
many people experiment with a variety of poten-
tially addictive drugs, but most do not become
addicted.1 In other words, mere self-
administration of a drug, by a human or by a
non-human animal, is not tantamount to addic-
tion.2 Indeed, the factors responsible for exper-
imental or casual drug use may or may not be
directly relevant to the problem of addiction.
Drug-seeking and drug-taking in the addict may
involve factors that are qualitatively different
from those that motivate drug-taking in the non-
addict. The question of addiction speci cally
concerns (a) the process by which drug-taking
behavior, in certain individuals, evolves into
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compulsive patterns of drug-seeking and drug-
taking behavior that take place at the expense of
most other activities, and (b) the inability to
cease drug-taking, that is, the problem of re-
lapse.2 The purpose of this paper is to explore
one view of the psychological and neurobiologi-
cal mechanisms responsible speci cally for the
development of compulsive patterns of drug use
that de ne addiction, and to update our earlier
treatise on this subject.3
Negative and positive reinforcement models
Most contemporary explanations of addiction
suggest that addicts are motivated to take drugs
(crave drugs) for one of two reasons. As put by
Markou et al.,4 “Drug craving is characterized by
both the desire to experience the positive hedo-
nic effects of the drug … and the desire to avoid
aversive withdrawal symptoms …” (p. 176).
That is, it is generally thought that addicts are
motivated to take drugs either for the pleasure
drugs produce (basically to achieve remembered
pleasure), or to avoid the unpleasant conse-
quences of withdrawal. Some authors place the
weight of explanatory burden on the aversive
consequences of discontinuing drug use (the
withdrawal syndrome), and thus on the action of
drugs as negative reinforcers.2,5–7 For example,
Koob and colleagues8–10 have argued that: “the
motivation for maintenance of compulsive drug
use requires negative reinforcement processes …”
(Koob et al.,9 p. 519, italics added) and that,
“From a motivational perspective, addiction can
be equated with the development of a negative
affect” (Koob,11 p. 13).
Limitations of negative reinforcement models
Despite the intuitive appeal of withdrawal avoid-
ance models many authors have pointed out the
short-comings of negative reinforcement models
in general as explanations for addiction.3,12–15
For example, drugs that do not produce strong
withdrawal syndromes, such as psychostimu-
lants, can be highly addictive. Conversely, there
are drugs that produce tolerance and withdrawal
syndromes but do not support compulsive pat-
terns of use. The latter compounds include some
tricyclic antidepressants, anticholinergics and
kappa opioid agonists.14 Thus, as put by Jaffe,14
“there is little correlation between the visibility
or physiological seriousness of withdrawal signs
and their motivational force” (p. 9). Another
problem for withdrawal-based explanations is
that drug craving is often elicited by drug admin-
istration itself, in association with euphorigenic
effects, at the moments when withdrawal symp-
toms should be at their weakest. Similarly, in
animals trained to self-administer heroin, re-
instatement of drug-taking behavior following
extinction is more potently elicited by a priming
injection of heroin, which elicits a drug-like ef-
fect, than by the injection of an opioid antago-
nist, which induces withdrawal signs.16,17 For
human addicts, the prolonged cessation of drug
use, during which time withdrawal symptoms
decay, is by no means a guarantee of a cure, as
relapse to compulsive use even long after with-
drawal is over remains a major problem in
addiction.18 In conclusion, although there is no
doubt that under some circumstances the desire
to avoid withdrawal can be a potent motive for
drug use, for these and other reasons many
authors have suggested that models of addic-
tion based on the alleviation of withdrawal symp-
toms (whether “physical” or “psychological”) are
neither necessary nor suf cient to explain com-
pulsive drug-seeking and drug-taking behav-
ior.3,14,15
Limitations of behaviorist positive reinforcement
models
In part because of the shortcomings of negative
reinforcement models alternative models have
placed considerable emphasis on the action of
drugs as positive reinforcers.14 Positive reinforcers
are stimuli that have the property of increasing
the probability of behaviors that immediately
precede their presentation. Like many natural
rewards, such as food and water, potentially
addictive drugs have this property. In the drug
abuse literature, however, the Skinnerian con-
cept of positive reinforcement is often invoked,
either implicitly or explicitly, as though it were
an explanation of drug-taking behavior, and even
as an explanation of why drug-taking behavior
becomes more and more compulsive in the
development of addiction. (Why do people take
drugs? Because drugs are positive reinforcers.) But
this is a confusion. It is equivalent to saying
that the reason people take drugs is because
drugs promote drug-taking behavior; the cir-
cularity is obvious.15 It is important to remem-
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ber that positive reinforcement, taken as a
behaviorist concept, is only a description of a
behavioral effect, not an explanation of the effect
(Berridge & Robinson,19 see footnote 3 for de-
tailed discussion). In de ning reinforcement
Skinner himself20 said, “The only de ning
characteristic of a reinforcing stimulus is that it
reinforces”, and argued that, “there is nothing
circular about classifying events in terms of their
effects …”. But he also said, “It would be circu-
lar, however, if we then went on to assert that a
given event strengthens an operant because it is
reinforcing” (his italics, pp. 72–3). Or, as put so
well by Dews,21 “… many things can reinforce
and many things can be maintained by reinforce-
ment; which is  ne, of course, provided that we
do not come to suppose that in demonstrating
that an event is a reinforcer we have demon-
strated something more than that the event is a
reinforcer”. “Any worker studying behavioral
phenomena knows that a reinforcer is de ned
and recognized through its effects on behavior;
the sole criteria are behavioral. But any impartial
observer of the same workers will see that teleol-
ogy, like hope, springs eternal in even a scienti c
worker’s breast” (p. 77). In other words, behav-
iorist reinforcement should not be mistaken to
be an explanation of either drug-taking or addic-
tion in either a physiological or psychological
sense. The critical question relevant for addic-
tion is, what explains it. That is, what effect of a
drug is responsible for its positively reinforcing
behavioral property, and how does it cause the
development of compulsive drug-seeking and
drug-taking habits?
Wise & Bozarth15 suggested that, “the only
existing positive reinforcement view of addiction
that can qualify as an explanatory theory
identi es positive reinforcement with drug eu-
phoria” (p. 474). In this view (hedonia view)
drugs are addicting because they produce positive
affective states that people label with words such
as pleasure or euphoria, and these states are what
addicts seek. This pleasure-seeking view of ad-
diction is the simple common-sense view of ad-
diction. People want drugs (are motivated to
seek and take drugs) because they like drugs
(because drugs give pleasure). In this view the
motivation to take drugs (drug wanting) is di-
rectly attributable to the ability of drugs to pro-
duce pleasure, i.e. there is a necessary causal
relationship between wanting drugs and liking
drugs.
Limitations of drug pleasure (hedonic reinforcement)
models
It is probably true that often people are initially
motivated to take drugs because of the ability of
drugs to produce positive affective states (and
because their peers are doing it, and for many
other complicated psychosocial reasons), but in
the addict the association between the hedonic
consequences of drug consumption and the abil-
ity of drugs and drug-related stimuli to motivate
behavior often become dissociated, revealing that
the relationship between the motivational force
of drugs and their hedonic consequences may
not be a necessary causal relationship. As Dews21
cautioned many years ago, “… it was supposed
that the prediction of addiction liability was es-
sentially equivalent to prediction of euphorigenic
power. As with most self-evident ideas, the mere
matter of there being essentially no evidence in
favor of it, and much against it, had little effect
on its acceptance” (p. 75).
Perhaps the most compelling evidence against
the idea that the ability of drugs to promote
drug-taking is directly attributable to their sub-
jective pleasurable effects comes from studies
showing that subjective states are often poorly
correlated with drug-taking. First, drug-taking
may increase dramatically over time as an addic-
tion develops, but the pleasure induced by a
given dose of a drug is not reported to increase
(see note 5 in Robinson & Berridge3 for a dis-
cussion of this point). If addicts craved drugs in
proportion to their ability to produce pleasure,
then craving late in addiction ought not to be
stronger then craving after the initial drug ex-
perience—but of course that is not the case.
Secondly, after pharmacological manipula-
tions there is often a dissociation between the
reported subjective effects of cocaine and co-
caine-taking behavior.22–27 For example, Haney
et al.26 reported recently that pergolide decreased
cocaine’s cardiovascular effects, decreased rat-
ings of its subjective effects (“high”,
“stimulated”), increased ratings of “I want co-
caine”, while having no effect whatsoever on
cocaine self-administration behavior. Similarly,
Haney et al.27 reported: “that even a 50% de-
crease in certain of cocaine’s subjective effects by
ABT-431 … did not shift cocaine self-adminis-
tration” (p. 108). Along the same lines, Comer et
al.28 reported that doses of intranasal and intra-
venous heroin that maintained the same
“breakpoint” on a progressive ratio schedule re-
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sulted in very different subjective ratings of
“high”.
Thirdly, it has been reported that people will
work for low doses of morphine or cocaine that
produce no subjective pleasure at all; doses that
indeed produce no reported subjective effects of
any kind.22,24,29 In summarizing their  ndings
Lamb et al.29 concluded: “The reinforcing effects
of morphine can occur in the absence of self-re-
ported subjective effects and thus, do not appear
to be causally related to drug-liking or euphoria”
(p. 1172). These kinds of data are very import-
ant because they establish that the motivation to
take drugs (drug wanting) is not always directly
attributable to the subjective pleasurable effects
of drugs (drug liking), and it is possible this is
especially true in addicts. That is, one must
consider the possibility that in addicts the sub-
jective pleasurable effects and the motivational
effects of drugs are merely correlated effects. They
occur together most of the time, but they can be
dissociated and there is no necessary causal
relationship between them.
Incentive–sensitization
If compulsive drug-seeking and drug-taking be-
havior are often not motivated by either the
desire to obtain pleasure or by the desire to
relieve withdrawal, then what motivates addic-
tive behavior in these instances? Why do addicts
compulsively seek drugs? We have attempted to
address these questions by proposing the con-
cept of “incentive–sensitization”.3,30 The basic
thesis of the incentive–sensitization view of ad-
diction can be summarized in four points.
(1) Potentially addictive drugs share the ability
to produce long-lasting adaptations in neural
systems (i.e. addictive drugs change the
brain).
(2) The brain systems that are changed include
those normally involved in the process of
incentive motivation and reward.
(3) The critical neuroadaptations for addiction
render these brain reward systems hypersen-
sitive (“sensitized”) to drugs and drug-
associated stimuli.
(4) The brain systems that are sensitized do
not mediate the pleasurable or euphoric ef-
fects of drugs (drug “liking”), but instead
they mediate a subcomponent of reward we
have termed incentive salience or
“wanting”.3,19,30–33 It is the psychological
process of incentive salience speci cally that
is responsible for instrumental drug-seeking
and drug-taking behavior (drug “wanting”).
We have hypothesized that when sensitized,
this incentive salience process produces compul-
sive patterns of drug-seeking behavior.3,30
Through associative learning the enhanced in-
centive value becomes focused speci cally on
drug-related stimuli, leading to more and more
compulsive patterns of drug-seeking and drug-
taking behavior. Furthermore, the persistence of
neural sensitization is hypothesized to leave ad-
dicts susceptible to relapse even long after the
discontinuation of drug use. In the following we
will review some of the evidence for incentive–
sensitization, and elaborate some of the major
features of this view of addiction.
Psychomotor sensitization
Most studies showing that the repeated adminis-
tration of drugs of abuse can produce sensitiza-
tion (i.e. an increase in drug effect) involve
measures of the psychomotor activating effects of
drugs, such as their ability to enhance locomotor
activity, rotational behavior or stereotyped motor
patterns.3,34–36 The majority of these studies in-
volve psychomotor stimulant drugs. Studies on
the psychomotor activating effects of drugs are
thought to be relevant to addiction because of
the assumption that the neural substrate that
mediates these effects is either the same as, or at
least overlaps with, the neural substrate respon-
sible for the rewarding effects of drugs.15 This
neural substrate is, of course, the mesotelen-
cephalic dopamine system, and especially do-
pamine projections to the nucleus accumbens
and accumbens-related circuitry (often called the
mesolimbic or mesocorticolimbic dopamine
system).
There is now considerable evidence that the
repeated intermittent administration of psycho-
motor stimulant drugs results in a progressive
increase in their psychomotor activating effects,
and an example of this effect is illustrated in Fig.
1. Although most studies of psychomotor sensi-
tization involve the administration of psychomo-
tor stimulants, such as amphetamine or cocaine,
psychomotor sensitization has been reported
with many other drugs of abuse as well, includ-
ing methylphenidate, fencamfamine, morphine,
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Figure 1. An illustration of three ways of quantifying sensitization of rotational behavior in rats with a unilateral 6-OHDA
lesion given repeated i.p. injections of 3.0 mg/kg of d-amphetamine sulfate (data from Anagnostaras & Robinson73). Left
panel: mean ( 6 SEM) number of rotations per 5-minute interval over 10 consecutive 90-minute test sessions in animals given
amphetamine (open circles) or saline (closed circles). Test sessions were every 3–4 days. Sensitization is indicated by the
progressive increase in drug effect seen with repeated amphetamine treatment. Middle panel: the time course of the behavioral
response when both saline and amphetamine pretreated animals were given a challenge injection of 1.5 mg/kg of
d-amphetamine. The challenge session was 3–4 days after the last (10th) pretreatment session. Sensitization is indicated by
a signi cantly greater behavioral response in amphetamine than in saline pretreated animals. Right panel: sensitization can
also be quanti ed by measuring the magnitude of the shift to the left in the amphetamine dose–effect function in drug versus
saline pretreated animals (see Anagnostaras & Robinson73).
phencyclidine, MDMA, nicotine and ethanol
(for references, see Robinson & Berridge3).
Most directly relevant to the topic of this
volume on alcohol abuse is evidence for sensi-
tization to ethanol. There is relatively little re-
search on this topic, and it is especially dif cult
to study the psychomotor activating effects of
drugs that also have motor depressant effects,
such as morphine or ethanol. With morphine this
problem has been obviated to some extent by
using direct injections of the drug into the ven-
tral tegmental area. Nevertheless, there is a
growing literature that suggests the repeated ad-
ministration of ethanol does indeed induce psy-
chomotor sensitization.37–44 There is also
evidence for cross-sensitization between ethanol
and other drugs of abuse, including reports that
pretreatment with ethanol enhances the sub-
sequent psychomotor effects of cocaine,40 am-
phetamine45 and morphine,46 and that cocaine
pretreatment potentiates ethanol’s effects.40
Cross-sensitization between stress and ethanol
has also been reported.44 Especially relevant to
the present discussion is evidence that repeated
treatment with amphetamine increases ethanol
intake when rats are tested 3 months after the
cessation of amphetamine treatment,47 suggest-
ing there may be long-lasting sensitization to
ethanol’s rewarding effects.48,49
Research on the neurobiology of ethanol sensi-
tization is in its infancy, but there are reports
that ethanol sensitization is associated with neu-
roadaptations in dopamine and accumbens-
related circuitry40,46 that are reminiscent of
changes seen with other drugs of abuse. For
example, Nestby et al.46 have reported that re-
peated treatment with cocaine, amphetamine,
morphine or ethanol all increase the electrically
evoked release of dopamine and acetylcholine
from striatal slices in vitro. The extent to which
different drugs of abuse induce similar neuroad-
aptations in brain reward circuitry remains an
open question. It is highly likely, however, that
different drugs will induce different adaptations,
especially at the cellular and molecular level (e.g.
White et al.50). It is possible that the overall
outcome will be similar for the operation of
neural systems that mediate the incentive moti-
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vational effects of drugs, including ethanol. This
remains an important topic for future investiga-
tion.
Psychomotor sensitization is a very complex
and rich phenomenon with many interesting fea-
tures, most of which are not well understood.
For example, for many drugs sensitization is
typically seen only when drugs are administered
intermittently, and the most robust sensitization
occurs when injections are widely spaced in
time.34 Sensitization is dose-dependent; the most
robust sensitization occurs after treatment with
relatively high doses.51,52 Sensitization is also of-
ten time-dependent.53 That is, sensitization is
typically more evident long after the discontinu-
ation of repeated drug treatment than shortly
after the discontinuation of drug treatment. Per-
haps the most remarkable feature of sensitization
is its persistence. Once they have been sensitized,
animals may remain hypersensitive to the psy-
chomotor activating effects of drugs for months
or years.34,54 There is relatively little parametric
research on this aspect of sensitization, but its
persistence is probably dependent on complex
interactions among the dose administered, the
interval between treatments, the number of
treatments, the route of administration, the en-
vironment in which the drug is given, the sex and
strain of the animal and, of course, what drug is
administered.34,55–57 Finally, it important to em-
phasize that the ability of drugs to induce psy-
chomotor sensitization is not a function of the
fact that in most animal studies the drug is
administered by the experimenter. There are
now a number of reports that drug self-
administration experience also promotes psycho-
motor sensitization.58–60
Individual differences in susceptibility to sensitization
There are two other important features of sensi-
tization that deserve mention. One is individual
variation. There is enormous variation across
individuals in susceptibility to sensitization.56
Even in animal studies, some individuals show
rapid and robust sensitization with a given dose
of a drug, whereas others sensitize very little, if at
all. There are many factors that contribute to
individual variation in the susceptibility to sensi-
tization, including genetic, hormonal and experi-
ential factors. For example, genetic factors have
been implicated by studies showing that there
are marked strain differences in the susceptibility
to psychomotor sensitization in both rats61,62 and
mice.44,56,63 Gonadal hormones have been impli-
cated in studies reporting sex differences in sus-
ceptibility to sensitization,64–66 and these sex
differences are attenuated by castration of male
rats.66,67 Experiential factors have been impli-
cated by studies reporting cross-sensitization be-
tween stress and psychostimulant drugs.44,56,68
The mechanisms by which these factors
in uence susceptibility to sensitization are
largely unknown, although the factors that pre-
dispose animals to sensitization appear to be
different than those that confer acute sensitivity
to drugs.56,63,69–71 Nevertheless, the incentive–
sensitization theory posits that factors which ren-
der people susceptible to sensitization will also
contribute to individual variation in susceptibil-
ity to addiction.
Modulation of sensitization by the circumstances
surrounding drug administration
Another important feature of sensitization we
want to emphasize is that sensitization is not an
inevitable consequence of repeated exposure to
drugs. Instead, the ability of drugs to induce or
express sensitization is powerfully modulated by
learning and the circumstances surrounding drug
administration.72 There are at least two ways that
the circumstances surrounding drug administra-
tion modulate sensitization. The  rst is modu-
lation of the expression of neural sensitization
that has already been induced. Perhaps the best
example of environmental modulation of ex-
pression is the phenomenon of context-speci c
sensitization. In studies of this type, typically one
group of animals receives drug injections in a
unique test environment and another group re-
ceives injections in a different environment (of-
ten in its home cage). On the test day all animals
receive a challenge injection in the same environ-
ment (the test environment). Only the animals
treated with drug in the test environment usually
express sensitization. The animals treated with
drug in a different environment often fail to
express sensitization in the test environment,
where drug has never before been experienced.
Thus, the expression of sensitization is said to be
“context-speci c”.73–76 An implication for hu-
mans is that the expression of neural sensitiza-
tion in addicts can be expected to be strongest in
those contexts in which drugs have often been
taken before.
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Despite this powerful associative (conditioned
stimulus) control over the expression of sensi-
tization there are at least two reasons to believe
that neural sensitization occurs even in the ani-
mals that do not express behavioral sensitization.
The  rst is that animals receiving drug treat-
ments in an environment other than the test
environment (e.g. in a “third world”) develop
normal behavioral sensitization in their drug
treatment environment; they simply do not ex-
press it in a different environment that has never
been paired with drug administration.73 Sec-
ondly, neural sensitization has been described
under conditions that preclude the in uence of
contextual stimuli on the neurobiological ex-
pression of the drug response. For example, evi-
dence for neural sensitization to a number of
drugs has been reported using striatal tissue
slices in vitro and in anaesthetized animals.46,77–81
It appears, therefore, that repeated exposure to
amphetamine may induce neural sensitization
non-associatively, but whether the consequences
of neural sensitization are expressed at a particu-
lar place or time is determined to a large extent
by conditional stimuli (especially contextual
stimuli) that have been associatively paired with
drug administration.73 Furthermore, it has been
hypothesized that contextual stimuli may often
act not only as traditional excitors (i.e. a CS 1 ) to
produce a conditioned response (CR), but as a
different class of conditional stimuli known as
occasion-setters, which can modulate drug re-
sponses without producing a CR.73 It may be
that this interaction of neural sensitization with
associative learning is responsible for the focus
on drug-associated stimuli in addicts, whereby
the acts and objects associated with drug-taking
become especially powerful incentives them-
selves. Contextual modulation of the expression
of sensitization may contribute to the critical role
that context plays in precipitating relapse. That
is, an implication for addiction is that the ex-
pression of sensitization to the incentive proper-
ties of drug-related stimuli may be strongest in
contexts that have been also distinctly related to
drug-taking in the past. The ability of context to
act as an occasion-setter and to modulate sensi-
tization would interact with the ability of speci c
drug-associated conditioned stimuli to trigger
craving as a classically conditioned response,
combining to provide very strong contextual
control over both craving and relapse.3
The second way that the circumstances sur-
rounding drug administration may modulate
sensitization is to in uence whether neural sensi-
tization is induced in the  rst place (or at least
the rate and extent of sensitization produced by
a given dose of a drug). For example, there are
now a number of reports that when low to
moderate doses of amphetamine or cocaine are
administered in the environment where an ani-
mal lives (i.e. at “home”) they are less effective
in inducing psychomotor sensitization than if the
same doses are given in a relatively distinctive
test environment; one that is novel to the animal
until its  rst pairing with the drug.82–84 Indeed, if
amphetamine is administered at home using a
chronically indwelling i.v. catheter, so that drug
administration is completely unsignaled, doses of
0.375–1.0 mg/kg (i.v.) fail to induce sensitiza-
tion.72,85,86 The same doses do induce sensitiza-
tion if drug administration is signaled by
placement of an animal into a distinctly predic-
tive test environment. A similar effect has also
been seen with both cocaine51 and morphine
(Badiani et al., unpublished studies). Further
studies have established that the effect of
unsignaled drug administration is not to com-
pletely preclude sensitization, but to shift the
dose–effect curve for the induction of sensitiza-
tion. When high enough doses of either cocaine
or amphetamine are given sensitization is in-
duced regardless of environmental condition.51,52
The ability of environmental context to modu-
late the induction of sensitization may be related
to its ability to modulate the neural circuitry
engaged by drugs. Badiani and colleagues87 re-
cently reported, for example, that the ability of
amphetamine to induce c-fos mRNA in the stria-
tum is powerfully modulated by the environmen-
tal context in which amphetamine is
administered. Indeed, it appears that that en-
vironmental context can modulate which cell
populations in the striatum are engaged by am-
phetamine. When given at home amphetamine
induced c-fos only in striatal neurons also posi-
tive for dopamine D1 receptor mRNA (not in
cells positive for D2 receptor mRNA); but when
given in association with environmental novelty
amphetamine induced c-fos in both D1 and D2
mRNA-positive neurons.88
In summary, sensitization is not an inevitable
consequence of exposure to potentially addictive
drugs. That is, it is not a simple pharmacological
phenomenon, but both the expression and the
induction of sensitization can be powerfully
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modulated by non-pharmacological factors, in-
cluding environmental (and presumably psycho-
logical) factors associated with drug
administration. The in uence of environmental
factors on sensitization has important implica-
tions not only for understanding the phenom-
enon, but for thinking about therapeutic
approaches in treating addiction (see below).
Sensitization and drug reward
The studies reviewed above on sensitization to
the psychomotor activating effects of drugs indi-
cate that addictive drugs induce neural sensitiza-
tion. However, by themselves they provide only
indirect evidence that sensitization occurs to the
incentive motivational or rewarding effects of
drugs.15 More direct evidence that the neural
substrate that is sensitized is involved in mediat-
ing drug reward comes from two other sources.
The  rst are studies showing that not only do the
psychomotor stimulant effects of drugs sensitize,
but so do their rewarding effects.89 There are
a number of reports that prior exposure to
a variety of potentially addictive drugs enhan-
ces the later acquisition of both a drug self-
administration habit90–97 or a conditioned place
preference.98–102 Prior sensitization to am-
phetamine also increases the “breakpoint” for
amphetamine self-administration when rats are
tested using a progressive ratio schedule,103,104
and the enhanced responding for a conditioned
reward produced by intra-accumbens am-
phetamine is potentiated by cocaine sensitiza-
tion.105 Furthermore, in recent studies Deroche
et al.106 have found that experience with self-
administered cocaine later enhances the motiv-
ation to seek cocaine in, for example, a runway
apparatus, and De Vries and colleagues in the
Netherlands have reported that the ability of
different drugs to reinstate (prime) drug-seeking
behavior is positively related to whether they also
show cross-psychomotor sensitization.107–110 In-
deed, these latter researchers have reported, “all
of the agonists that elicited sensitized locomotor
responses in morphine- or amphetamine-pre-
treated rats … appeared to cause reinstatement
of previously extinguished heroin or cocaine-
seeking behavior, respectively. Taken together,
these studies suggest a marked relationship be-
tween drug-seeking behavior and drug sensitiza-
tion” (Vanderschuren et al.,110, p. 251).
Similarly, Deroche et al.106 concluded on the
basis of their experiments that, “the progressive
shift from cocaine use to dependence and the
very high frequency of relapse of abstinent
abusers probably originate from a sensitization
phenomenon”.
The ability of sensitization to enhance respon-
siveness to rewards does not appear to be
con ned to drug rewards, but also applies to
other aspects of incentive motivation. Repeated
treatment with either morphine111 or am-
phetamine,112 for example, later facilitates the
appetitive or anticipatory phase of a sexual en-
counter. Male rats sensitized to amphetamine
later exhibit facilitated sexual behavior towards
an estrus female, “as indicated by shorter laten-
cies to mount and intromit, and a greater per-
centage of rats copulating” (Fiorino &
Phillips,112 p. 200). This sensitization-related fa-
cilitation of sexual motivation is accompanied by
augmented dopamine ef ux in the nucleus ac-
cumbens in response to presentation of a recep-
tive female.113 In discussing their  ndings
Fiorino & Phillips112 (p. 206) raised the related
and very interesting clinical observation that, “As
many as 70% of patients admitted to a New
York cocaine addiction treatment program were
also reported to suffer from compulsive sexu-
ality”.114 Sensitization may also facilitate re-
sponding to learned properties of rewards (even
though mesostriatal dopamine systems are not
essential for reward learning19). This suggestion
is consistent with recent reports that sensitization
to amphetamine can facilitate the acquisition of
both excitatory115,116 and inhibitory117 Pavlovian
associations in a task using food (sucrose) re-
ward. Harmer & Phillips117,118 point out that the
ability of amphetamine sensitization to facilitate
behavior guided by Pavlovian learning may be
related to its ability to enhance amphetamine-
stimulated dopamine ef ux in both the nucleus
accumbens115,119 and amygdala.115,116 The rela-
tive roles of the amygdala versus the accumbens
in this associative facilitation are as yet un-
clear.120
The second line of evidence that the neural
substrate sensitized by drugs of abuse is involved
in mediating drug reward comes from studies on
the neurobiology of sensitization. There is not
space here to review this large literature, but
suf ce it to say there is now considerable evi-
dence that behavioral sensitization is associated
with neuroadaptations in dopamine/accumbens
systems.3,34,36,121 –124 This is important because it
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is well established that these neural systems play
an important role in mediating the rewarding
effects of drugs and other incentives.15,125,126
Thus, if sensitization-related neuroadaptations
are found in this mesocorticolimbic circuitry this
is strong evidence that at least one neural system
known to be critical for mediating drug reward
undergoes “neural sensitization”.
Both pre- and post-synaptic neuroplastic
adaptations have been described in the do-
pamine/accumbens system of sensitized animals.
An example of a presynaptic adaptation is a
persistent increase in the ability of a variety of
drugs to increase the over ow of dopamine in
the nucleus accumbens and striatum of sensi-
tized animals, in vitro and in vivo.3,34,46,79–81,121,122
Examples of postsynaptic adaptations include an
increase in the sensitivity of dopamine D1 recep-
tors78,123 and a decrease in the sensitivity of
glutamate receptors127 in the nucleus accumbens
of sensitized animals (see Wolf124 for a review of
the role of excitatory amino acids in sensitiza-
tion). More recently it has been reported that
both amphetamine and cocaine sensitization are
also accompanied by persistent structural
modi cations in the morphology of output neu-
rons in both the nucleus accumbens and prefron-
tal cortex.128,129 Repeated treatment with
amphetamine or cocaine increases the length of
dendrites on medium spiny neurons in the nu-
cleus accumbens and on pyramidal neurons in
the prefrontal cortex. This is accompanied by an
increase in spine density on the distal dendrites
of these cells. On medium spiny neurons there is
an especially large increase in the number of
branched spines; that is, spines with multiple
heads. These structural data suggest that sensi-
tization may involve more than a simple up- or
downregulation of biochemical processes, but it
may involve changes in patterns of synaptic con-
nectivity in brain reward systems, changes that
may be similar to those seen in other neural
systems in association with other forms of experi-
ence-dependent plasticity.128,129 These observa-
tions are consistent with increasing evidence
implicating neurotrophic factors in sensitiza-
tion.130–132
To reiterate the basic thesis of the incentive–
sensitization view of addiction, it was originally
proposed3 that addictive drugs share the ability
to produce persistent neuroadaptations in brain
regions involved in the process of incentive mo-
tivation and reward, adaptations that render
these regions hypersensitive (“sensitized”). It
should be clear from the above that there is now
a wealth of evidence to support this claim. The
incentive–sensitization view also posits that it is
largely because of sensitization of a neural sub-
strate that mediates drug reward that with re-
peated drug use drugs gradually become more
and more attractive (i.e. they acquire greater and
greater incentive value), and become increasingly
able to control behavior. Studies on sensitization
of drug reward support this claim. Furthermore,
we have suggested it is the persistence of neural
sensitization that leaves addicts susceptible to
relapse even long after the discontinuation of
drug use. Studies on the relationship between
sensitization and reinstatement in animal models
support this claim as well. Of course, these latter
hypotheses are more speculative, and are predi-
cated on the assumption that repeated exposure
to drugs of abuse can induce neural sensitization
in humans. It is one thing to demonstrate incen-
tive–sensitization in animals models, but—as
critics of our theory occasionally point out—
quite another to demonstrate its occurrence in
addicts.
Sensitization in humans
As might be expected from the dif culty in
studying this issue in humans, there has been
very little research on the topic of whether sensi-
tization actually occurs in the brains of human
addicts. It could be argued that the enormous
increase in the incentive value of drugs in the
development of addiction is de facto evidence for
sensitization of a neural substrate that mediates
this function in humans, but unfortunately for
us, many will consider this argument insuf cient.
Until recently, the only direct evidence that re-
peated exposure to psychostimulant drugs can
produce sensitization in humans came from
studies on the phenomenology of amphetamine
and cocaine psychosis.65,133–136 There is a con-
siderable clinical literature that suggests repeated
exposure to amphetamine or cocaine results in a
progressive increase in their psychotomimetic ef-
fects,133 and that this enhanced sensitivity may
persist long after the discontinuation of drug
use.134,135,137 Related effects have been described
in non-human primates.138
More direct evidence for sensitization to the
psychomotor effects of amphetamine in humans
has been lacking until only very recently, but
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there are now three reports of psychomotor sen-
sitization in humans. Strakowski et al.139  rst
reported the results of a double-blind, placebo-
controlled study in drug naive volunteers given
two treatments (48 hours apart) with 0.25 mg/kg
d-amphetamine. They found that the second
treatment with amphetamine elicited a
signi cantly greater increase than the  rst in four
behavioral measures: activity/energy, mood, rate
and amount of speech and eyeblink rate. In a
second study Strakowski & Sax140 replicated and
extended these  ndings to see if three treatments
with amphetamine would produce a progressive
increase in drug effect, as is usually seen in
animal experiments. Two measures increased
progressively with repeated amphetamine treat-
ment: activity/energy and eyeblink rate. Indeed,
for eyeblink rate there was no effect of the  rst
treatment with amphetamine, relative to placebo,
but an increase in eyeblink rate emerged with
subsequent drug treatments, even though the
dose was the same. Interestingly, subjective rat-
ings of drug liking did not increase with three
drug treatments, which is consistent with our
hypothesis that sensitization applies to “wanting”
drugs but not to “liking” drugs (see below).
These two studies involved within-subjects as-
sessments of sensitization. More recently,
Strakowski et al.141 reported evidence for
signi cant psychomotor sensitization in humans
using a between-subjects design. There has also
been one report which failed to  nd evidence for
cocaine sensitization in humans,142 but there are
at least two reasons that this may be the case.
First, as indicated by these authors in a letter to
the editor of Biological Psychiatry, experienced
cocaine users were used in this latter study and,
therefore, “because of their extensive cocaine
exposure prior to research participation [these
subjects] may have already undergone the maxi-
mum sensitization process … leaving no room
for the relatively short-term, low-dose research
exposure to demonstrate further sensitization”
(Gorelick & Rothman,143 p. 230). Secondly, as
pointed out by Strakowski et al.144 in their re-
sponse, “Rothman et al. concentrated on physio-
logic responses … [which] from animal
studies … would not be expected to exhibit sen-
sitization … and indeed, we also did not observe
sensitization in vital signs measurements”
(p. 230). Finally, additional evidence supporting
the concept of incentive–sensitization in humans,
relevant speci cally to drug taking, comes from
the interesting tentative observation of Bartlett et
al.145 that cocaine users who developed sensitiza-
tion to the psychotomimetic effects of the drug
have an elevated incidence of relapse, as indi-
cated by more frequent rehospitalizations.
Human imaging studies
Neuroimaging studies of human addicts are also
relevant to the incentive sensitization hypothesis
of addiction.3 Especially germane, for example,
is a study by Breiter and colleagues146 who used
functional MRI to monitor signals related to
blood  ow in the brain of human cocaine addicts
as they received intravenous cocaine or a vehicle.
As expected on the basis of animal studies, they
found that cocaine produced a rapid signal in-
crease in many structures, including the nucleus
accumbens, the neostriatum (caudate/putamen),
many neocortical regions, ventral tegmentum
and a variety of other brain areas. Signal de-
creases were seen in the amygdala, temporal pole
and the medial frontal cortex. All these transient
changes correlated with the cocaine rush or eu-
phoric effects reported by the addicts. Most in-
terestingly from the point of view of craving,
however, were more sustained changes in cer-
ebral blood  ow that outlasted the euphoric
rush, and that correlated best with subjective
craving reports for more cocaine. Craving-
correlated signal increases were found in the
nucleus accumbens region, parahippocampal
cortex and parts of the lateral prefrontal cor-
tex.146 A craving-correlated decrease in signal
was reported in the amygdala. Interestingly, one
region to show bilateral activation during a saline
retest was the nucleus accumbens, which the
authors speculate could be related to expectancy
for cocaine. Activation of this circuitry by stimuli
that predict cocaine, as has been reported in
animals studies (Berridge & Robinson,19 for re-
view), is certainly compatible with the incentive–
sensitization hypothesis.
A slightly different pattern of brain changes
was found in a PET study by Childress et al.147
who showed former cocaine addicts and normal
subjects videotapes with themes of drug-taking
designed to pique an addict’s craving for co-
caine. Childress et al.147 did not distinguish
anatomically between the nucleus accumbens
and other parts of the neostriatum, but had only
a single “caudate” category. The two brain re-
gions that in addicts that showed the greatest
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change in cerebral blood- ow in response to
viewing drug-related stimuli were the amygdala
and the caudate. Blood  ow increased
signi cantly in the amygdala and decreased
signi cantly in the caudate and lenticular nu-
cleus. Non-addict normal subjects did not show
any signi cant changes in blood  ow in response
to drug-related stimuli. In a related study Grant
et al.148 found that increases in glucose metab-
olism were correlated with self-reports of craving
provoked by drug-associated stimuli only in the
prefrontal cortex, amygdala and cerebellum (see
also Mass et al.149), whereas Wang et al.150 re-
ported changes in metabolism only in the or-
bitofrontal cortex, left insular cortex and
cerebellum.
Recently, PET has also been used to quantify
changes in blood  ow in heroin addicts given
either an injection of heroin, or exposed to
heroin-related cues.151 In this study both heroin
and heroin-related cues activated the same struc-
tures, especially a region of the midbrain cen-
tered on the periaqueductal grey (PAG) and
ventral tegmental area (VTA). The PAG has
projections to the VTA, and of course, the VTA
is the origin of ascending dopamine projections
to the nucleus accumbens and neocortex. Fur-
thermore, these authors reported that: “midbrain
activations predict responses to salient [drug-
related] cues in cortical and subcortical regions
implicated in reward-related behavior”, includ-
ing the anterior cingulate, amygdala and dorso-
lateral prefrontal cortex (Sell et al.,151 p. 1042).
It is dif cult to draw strong conclusions, given
the small number of studies so far, the limita-
tions of imaging techniques, and the apparent
discrepancies in results. It is interesting from the
point of view of the incentive-sensitization hy-
pothesis that in two studies of addicts the
strongest craving-correlated signal changes were
seen in the nucleus accumbens or caudate, as
well as amygdala.146,147 These studies disagree in
the direction of the accumbens/caudate signal
change, one suggesting an increase in blood  ow
during craving and the other suggesting a de-
crease. The interpretation of this difference in
direction is complicated by the different scales of
anatomical and temporal resolution used in these
studies, by reports that cocaine itself can pro-
duce cerebral vasoconstriction in humans,152 and
by the possibility that the neural signal conveyed
by dopamine may under some conditions be
inhibitory (hyperpolarizing) and in other condi-
tions excitatory.153,154 Nevertheless, there are
now a reasonable number of imaging studies
showing that the mesocorticolimbic projection
systems are engaged when addicts are given
drugs or when they are exposed to drug-
associated stimuli, and that in some cases this
is associated with reports of craving. Such data
are entirely consistent with the incentive–
sensitization theory of addiction.
In summary, although there is little research in
humans and it is fraught with technical limita-
tions, the available evidence suggests that (a)
repeated exposure to psychostimulant drugs can
sensitize some drug effects in humans, and (b)
the same mesocorticolimbic circuitry that in ani-
mals is known to mediate drug-seeking and to
show neural sensitization is also powerfully en-
gaged in humans upon exposure to drugs or
drug-associated stimuli. Further studies on be-
havioral sensitization in humans will be critical in
testing the notion of incentive–sensitization, but
it is worth injecting a note of caution in inter-
preting negative behavioral studies. It is not ob-
vious a priori which behavioral measures in
humans will provide the most sensitive indicators
of a sensitization process. This is even a dif cult
issue in animal studies. For example, it is often
dif cult to quantify behavioral sensitization using
measures of locomotor activity, unless just the
right dose and treatment conditions are used.85
Also, in rats, some behaviors show robust sensi-
tization, such as rotational behavior, repetitive
snif ng and repetitive head movements, whereas
other seemingly related stereotyped behaviors do
not, such as oral movements.34,85 Furthermore,
the doses used in studies with humans are lower
than those typically used in animal studies, and
drugs are often given orally. These conditions
may produce only marginal sensitization even in
animals.51,52
Finally, one needs to keep in mind that for the
most part indices of behavioral sensitization are
important only as secondary measures because
they provide indicators of underlying neuroadap-
tive processes (neural sensitization), and it is
neural sensitization that is critical or primary for
incentive–sensitization predictions regarding ad-
diction. Even in animal studies, the fact that a
behavior like rotational behavior sensitizes is of
interest only because the change in behavior
provides an indicator of an underlying neuroad-
aptive process, and because we know a great deal
about the neural systems that mediate this be-
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havior, and thus have some clues as to what
neural systems might be effected. The incentive–
sensitization hypothesis makes strong predictions
regarding neural sensitization in human addicts,
but not necessarily about what which speci c
behaviors might best re ect neural sensitization
(even though inferences can be drawn from ani-
mal studies). The critical prediction made by the
incentive-sensitization view of addiction is this:
the brains of human addicts who compulsively
crave drugs will contain a neural substrate that
has been rendered sensitized by drugs. A role of
that neural substrate will be to mediate the in-
centive salience of drug rewards. Further, indi-
viduals will differ in their susceptibility for
sensitization of that neural substrate, and those
who sensitize most readily will be most at risk for
addiction. These predictions are testable, and so
the incentive sensitization theory of addiction
can be con rmed or disproved on the basis of
empirical evidence.
A better understanding of the nature of neural
sensitization, based on animal studies, will be
crucial to developing proper tests of the theory in
human addicts. Once we understand the neural
basis of sensitization in non-human animals we
should be able to determine if the same neuroad-
aptions exist in the brains of addicts. If they do
not, the incentive–sensitization theory is proved
wrong. Of course, this proof  rst requires that
we understand which neurobiological adapta-
tions produced by repeated treatment with drugs
are causally related to the development of sensi-
tization, which we do not, as yet. Secondly, it
will require that adequate technological tools be
developed to quantify the relevant neuroadapta-
tions, in the relevant brain regions in humans,
which given the rapid advances in this  eld,
should appear in the future. Thus, future re-
search on neuroadaptations engendered by drug
use in humans, derived from an understanding
of the development of neural sensitization in
animal models, will eventually provide a  nal test
of the notion of incentive–sensitization.
“Wanting” versus “liking”
The  nal crucial issue we would like to address
concerns the nature of the psychological process
that is mediated by the neural substrate that
undergoes sensitization. To the extent this is the
dopamine/accumbens system it concerns the na-
ture of the incentive and reward function medi-
ated by this system. This leads us to the topic of
what we have termed “wanting” versus
“liking”.3,19,30,32,33,155
It is often assumed that the primary role of the
dopamine/accumbens systems in reward is to
mediate the subjective pleasurable or hedonic
aspects of reward (“liking”). This view was
stated most explicitly in Wise’s156 anhedonia hy-
pothesis of dopamine function (also Gardner &
Lowinson157). Wise156 argued that after disrup-
tion of dopamine neurotransmission by treat-
ment with dopamine antagonists, “all of life’s
pleasures—the pleasures of primary reinforce-
ment and the pleasures of their associated stim-
uli—lose their ability to arouse the animal”
(p. 52). Although this view is no longer held by
Wise,158 dopamine is typically associated with
pleasure in popular media accounts,159,160 and
this view is implicit or explicit in many scienti c
discussions of dopamine and reward.19 For ex-
ample, it is often argued that a suppression in
dopamine neurotransmission mediates anhedo-
nia during drug withdrawal,5,161–164 a view that is
a direct extension of Wise’s anhedonia hypoth-
esis of neuroleptic action.
The idea that drug pleasure is mediated by
dopamine systems continues to be endorsed by a
number of neuroscientists who study addiction.
In their own words, for example, Gardner &
Lowinson157 (p. 360) stated, “a subportion of
the mesolimbic dopamine neurons originating in
the ventral tegmental area … and synapsing into
the nucleus accumbens and adjacent ar-
eas … appears highly specialized for carrying
neural messages encoding hedonic tone” [our ital-
ics]. Thus, suppression of the dopamine system
is often held, as by Wise originally, to produce
dysphoria or anhedonia. In an explicit statement
of this hypothesis Dackis & Gold5 graphically
illustrated in their Fig. 4 the opinion that: “Since
increased dopamine neurotransmission can pro-
duce euphoric states, dopamine depletion after
cocaine use may lead to cocaine urges and dys-
phoria” (p. 473). This view was more recently
reiterated by Markou, Kosten & Koob,165 who
posit that “Based on the ample evidence for a
role of mesocorticolimbic dopamine neurotrans-
mission in reward and incentive/motivational
processes, and that abnormalities in these two pro-
cesses (i.e., inability to experience pleasure and loss
of motivation) constitute core symptoms of de-
pression, a dysfunction in the mesocorticolimbic do-
paminergic system may be mediating these
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symptoms” (p. 150; italics added). Similarly, Di
Chiara & Tanda166 (p. 353) posit that the ca-
pacity for pleasure is so closely linked to do-
pamine that a physiological measure of
dopamine neurotransmission should be able to
index psychological pleasure, proposing that “as
a biochemical test for anhedonia… [one may
measure] the blunting of DA neurotransmission
in the Nac ‘shell’ ”. Most investigators do not
make that inferential leap, but many appear to
presume that measures of neural activity in the
mesolimbic dopamine projection system re ect
the hedonic impact of an event. For example,
Childress and colleagues147 (pp. 11–12) hypo-
thesize that “brain structures activated during
cocaine craving may be among those activated
by cocaine itself, including the dopamine-
innervated limbic regions implicated in cocaine’s
pleasurable effects” (italics added). Indeed, on the
basis of PET studies with cocaine Volkow et
al.167 reported, “The magnitude of the self-
reported high was correlated with the degree of
dopamine transporter occupancy” (p. 827).
If a depression in dopamine neurotransmission
leads to anhedonia, it follows according to the
hedonia hypothesis that enhanced dopamine
neurotransmission should lead to enhanced plea-
sure. If that were true, then sensitized human
addicts should gain more pleasure than usual
from their drugs. Indeed, Koob & Le Moal10
(p. 52), in a discussion of drug abuse and hedo-
nic dysregulation, note  rst that, “the facilitation
of dopamine neurotransmission in the meso-
corticolimbic dopamine system appears to be
critical for the acute reinforcing actions” of drugs
of abuse, and go on to equate the positive rein-
forcing effects of drugs with hedonic euphoria.
They then explicitly incorporate sensitization
into their explanation of addiction by graphically
describing sensitization as producing a 10–20%
increase in a drug’s positive effect along a hedo-
nic scale (see their Fig. 4B, p. 56). In other
words, they postulate that repeated drug use may
sensitize or increase an addict’s experience of the
hedonic effect of a drug: enhanced drug “liking”
as well as drug “wanting” (in contrast to our
view that sensitization applies to drug “wanting”
but not to drug “liking”; see Fig. 2 below).
On the other hand, in different accounts Koob
and colleagues have hypothesized instead that
addiction is not driven primarily by an increase
in the hedonic impact of drugs themselves, but
rather driven by the negative hedonic conse-
Figure 2. A schematic illustration of the hypothetical
relationship between changes in the incentive value of drugs
(drug “wanting”) and changes in the ability of drugs to
produce subjective pleasurable effects (drug “liking”) during
the development of addiction. The top panel indicates the
relationship posited by the Robinson & Berridge3 incentive–
sensitization view. Robinson & Berridge3 argued that in the
development of addiction sensitization leads to enhanced
“wanting” due to sensitization of the neural substrate
responsible for incentive salience, while at the same time there
is either no change or a small decrease in the hedonic effects
of drugs (see Robinson & Berridge3 for a full discussion). The
bottom panel indicates the relationship posited by Koob & Le
Moal10 in their Fig. 4B. They indicate that sensitization is
characterized by an increase in the intensity of the primary
drug effect along a hedonic scale. That is, in the development
of addiction they suggest there is not only an increase in the
incentive value of drugs (“wanting” in our terms) but also an
increase in hedonic effect (“liking” in our terms).
quences of discontinuing drug use.8–10,165 They
argue, for example, that suppression of do-
pamine neurotransmission in withdrawal pro-
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duces “hedonic homeostatic dysregulation” or
dysphoria, and suggest addicts seek drugs to
re-establish “hedonic homeostasis” by taking
more drugs to restore dopamine neurotransmis-
sion to normal levels.10 In yet another account
Koob and colleagues168 have posited that addic-
tion is characterized by an increase in a “hedonic
set point”, whereby drug intake is escalated, they
say, because individuals, “are trying to reach and
then to maintain a higher state of intoxication”
(p. 300). Thus, in this latter formulation, there is
no sensitization to the hedonic impact of the
drug itself, but only, “a change in the hedonic set
point” (p. 299). It is unclear whether a set point
for pleasure actually exists, as the set point con-
cept implies that organisms should choose to
increase pleasure only to the level of their set
point, and not beyond that level. The only evi-
dence for a hedonic set point seems to be that
individuals achieve stable levels of drug self-
administration. Stable self-administration might
be explained by several factors, so one hopes that
a clearer explanation will be forthcoming by the
authors of what such a set point entails.
Despite their inconsistencies, all these hypoth-
eses share in common the idea that hedonic state
is what regulates compulsive patterns of drug-
seeking and drug-taking behavior in the addict,
and that changes in dopamine neurotransmission
move an individual up and down along an hedo-
nic scale. Many authors do not link dopamine
neurotransmission with drug pleasure so ex-
plicitly, as do Koob and colleagues, but many do
posit essentially the same point implicitly, by
substituting terms such as “reinforcement” for
the function mediated by dopamine neurotrans-
mission in ways that are dif cult to distinguish
from hedonic impact (e.g. Volkow et al.167; see
footnote 3 in Berridge & Robinson19 for a dis-
cussion of this point). Thus, it seems clear that
the dopamine hedonia hypothesis is not only
found in popular media accounts of dopamine’s
function in reward, but it still lives in the sci-
enti c literature. Although it is possible in prin-
ciple that dopamine systems mediate hedonic
processes, and that drug pleasure might show
sensitization, as Koob & Le Moal10 have pro-
posed, we must emphasize that this view differs
in at least two ways from our concept of in-
centive–sensitization. First, the incentive–
sensitization theory holds that drugs can activate
positive core processes of motivation in the ab-
sence of conscious awareness, so that positive
effects may not be indicated on any scale of
subjective affective intensity.3,19,30,155 For exam-
ple, as discussed above, drugs that activate do-
pamine systems may promote drug-taking
behavior in the absence of any subjective hedo-
nic effects,22,24,29 which is not consistent with the
notion that the positive reinforcing effects of
drugs can be equated with their hedonic impact.
Secondly, the incentive–sensitization theory ex-
plicitly posits that hedonic affect, either as sub-
jective pleasure or its underlying core process
(“liking”), is not the component of drug reward
that is sensitized in addiction, and is not the
psychological process that is mediated by do-
pamine systems.3,19,33 Instead, we have hypothe-
sized that dopamine systems are crucial to the
“wanting” component of incentive motiv-
ation.3,19,33 Indeed, there is convincing evidence
to support the view that mesoaccumbens do-
pamine systems do not mediate hedonic pro-
cesses, but rather mediate a separable “wanting”
component, namely incentive salience, in motiv-
ation and reward.3,19,31–33,169
The evidence that dopamine systems to not
mediate hedonic processes has been reviewed
recently by us,19 and so the main points are
summarized only brie y here. First, there is now
evidence from studies using neurochemical le-
sions, dopamine agonists or antagonists and
other manipulations which shows that alterations
in dopamine neurotransmission have no effect
on the ability of rats to make judgements about
the hedonic properties of taste stimuli19 (for re-
views, see Berridge33). For example, experiments
with rats that have complete striatal dopamine
depletions have established that caudate and ac-
cumbens dopamine is not necessary for reward-
ing taste stimuli to elicit normal hedonic
reactions.19,31,33,170 Secondly, there is an large
literature showing that dopamine and accum-
bens neurons often discharge in anticipation of
rewards, not during actual commerce with an
expected reward, when the most pleasure is pre-
sumably experienced.171,172 Thirdly, it is well
established that dopamine systems are activated
not only by positive stimuli, but by aversive,
painful and stressful stimuli and events (for ref-
erences, see Berridge & Robinson19 and Salam-
one et al.173). Fourthly, there is a growing
literature indicating that even in humans do-
pamine antagonists, such as pimozide or halope-
ridol, fail to reduce amphetamine-induced
ratings of pleasure or euphoria—even when the
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same antagonists reduce ratings of how much
amphetamine is wanted; i.e. a subjective liking/
wanting dissociation (for review, see Berridge &
Robinson,19 Berger et al.,174 Brauer & De-
Wit,175,176 and Ohuoha et al.177). Fifthly, enhanc-
ing dopamine neurotransmission is not suf cient
to produce pleasurable subjective effects in hu-
mans (for review, see Rothman & Glowa178). For
example, Volkow et al.179 (p. 14) state: “blockade
of striatal dopamine transporters by intravenous
methylphenidate [in humans] is not suf cient to
induce self-reports of ‘high’ ”. Thus, points 4
and 5 together suggest that in humans increased
dopamine neurotransmission is neither necessary
nor suf cient for psychostimulants to produce
subjective pleasurable effects.
In summary, despite correlational evidence for
a relationship between dopamine activation and
subjective pleasure in some instances (for exam-
ple, Volkow et al.167), a more thorough examin-
ation of the evidence does not support the
hypothesis that this represents a necessary causal
relationship, or that dopamine mediates plea-
sure.19,173 Given that the role of the dopamine/
accumbens system in reward is not related to the
hedonic aspects of reward, what is its contribu-
tion? What is the nature of the psychological
process that is “sensitized” in the addict?
We have interpreted the role of the dopamine/
accumbens system in reward, and the role of
sensitization of this substrate in addiction, in the
context of a view of incentive motivation devel-
oped from studies on the neural systems respon-
sible for taste hedonics. This view is an extension
of traditional psychological models of incentive
motivation developed by theorists such as
Bindra180 and Toates.181 In these traditional
models of incentive motivation, which coincide
with the common view expressed in much of the
literature, it was hypothesized that a single pro-
cess mediates both incentive value (how much
an incentive is “wanted”), and hedonic value
(how much it is “liked”). Incentives were hy-
pothesized to have incentive value because of
their ability to produce pleasure—“wanting” and
“liking” were therefore necessarily connected
and treated as explanations for positive re-
inforcement (in a non-circular sense). In our
extension of these earlier models, however, we
have hypothesized that the psychological process
and neural substrate responsible for motivating
behavior, for determining incentive value
(“wanting”), is separable from the psychological
process and neural substrate that mediates hedo-
nics (“liking”;3,19,32,33). Manipulations of mesote-
lencephalic dopamine systems alter “wanting”
more directly and powerfully than they alter
“liking”.19
It is further hypothesized that the psychologi-
cal process that leads to “wanting” involves the
attribution of attractive salience to stimuli and
their representations, a process we call incentive
salience attribution. We have suggested it is the
process of incentive salience attribution that
transforms the sensory features of ordinary stim-
uli or, more accurately, the neural and psycho-
logical representations of stimuli, so that they
become especially salient stimuli, stimuli that
“grab the attention”, that become especially at-
tractive and wanted, thus eliciting approach and
guiding behavior to the goal.3,19,33 It is incentive
salience that determines the value of incentives,
and that controls seeking and instrumental be-
havior regarding them.19
The major feature of our view of incentive
motivation that distinguishes it from earlier mod-
els is that it posits there are at least two distinct
psychological processes involved in reward: (a)
subjective pleasure (“liking”), and (b) incentive
salience attribution (“wanting”). These two psy-
chological processes are mediated by different
neural systems. Furthermore, it is suggested that
the neural systems that are sensitized by addictive
drugs are those involved speci cally in incentive
salience attribution.3 The neural systems that
mediate the subjective pleasurable (hedonic) ef-
fects of drugs do not appear to sensitize. This
may be why addiction is characterized by an
increasing dissociation between the incentive
value of drugs (how much they are wanted) and
their subjective pleasurable effects (how much
they are liked). With the development of an
addiction drugs become pathologically wanted
(“craved”) and this can occur even if drugs are
liked less and less. The distinction between the
Robinson & Berridge3 “incentive salience sensi-
tization” view and the Koob & Le Moal10
“hedonic sensitization” view is illustrated graphi-
cally in Fig. 2.
Finally, it is interesting to consider that the
neural system responsible for incentive salience
attribution can sometimes produce goal-directed
behavior (“wanting”) not only in the absence of
subjective pleasure, as discussed above,29 but in
the absence of conscious awareness of “wanting”
itself.30,33,155 Activation of this system may con-
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stitute an implicit rather than explicit psycholog-
ical process, similar to implicit memory or to
implicit perceptual processes,182,183 and can act
sometimes as an unconscious motivational pro-
cess.3,30,155 We become aware of its activation
only by engaging interpretive cognitive processes
needed to translate implicit activation into ex-
plicit subjective feelings.19,184–186 It may be be-
cause these psychological processes often operate
outside of conscious awareness that addicts have
so little insight into why they want drugs so
much. Addicts may report they are miserable,
their life is in ruins, and that even the drug is not
that great anymore. They are themselves bewil-
dered by the intensity of their own compulsive
behavior. Indeed, addicts probably have no more
insight into what motivates their daily behavior
than do the rest of us; which is arguably, not
much186–188 (for additional discussion and refer-
ences, see Berridge & Robinson30 and
Berridge155).
The incentive–sensitization view of addiction
has focused on drug-induced alterations in ac-
cumbens-related circuitry and associated
changes in motivational processes, and how
these may enhance associative learning. We must
emphasize, however, that incentive–sensitization
is just one contributor to addiction, and that
drugs of abuse produce persistent alterations in
many neural systems, altering many other psy-
chological processes. Some of these may contrib-
ute directly to the development and/or
manifestation of sensitized incentive salience,
and others may contribute to addiction via alter-
nate mechanisms. For example, in addition to
drug hedonic processes, withdrawal-related pro-
cesses and incentive salience processes, Phillips
and his colleagues115–118 have described sensitiza-
tion-related changes in dopaminergic activity in
the amygdala that may directly facilitate Pavlo-
vian learning. Sarter & Bruno189 recently re-
viewed evidence that sensitization also increases
the activity of basal forebrain cholinergic neu-
rons, leading to enhanced cortical acetylcholine-
mediated activity. They hypothesized that this
may lead to alterations in attentional processes,
in particular, cognitive or hyperattentional states
that may contribute to the pathological levels of
incentive salience attributed to drug-related
stimuli. Finally, a number of researchers have
suggested that repeated exposure to psychostim-
ulant drugs may result in frontocortical dysfunc-
tion and associated cognitive de cits, including
impairments in decision-making and judge-
ment.190 Indeed, there is increasing evidence that
cocaine addicts show both neuropsychologi-
cal191,192 and neurobiological191,193–195 signs of
frontal dysfunction. Resulting impairments of
cognitive strategies to avoid drug use196 or to
control impulsivity190 might interact with the
increased motivation to seek and take drugs via
the process of incentive–sensitization described
here. Thus, in the addict, drugs may become
increasingly “wanted” while at the same time the
ability to make reasoned judgements about the
future consequences of continued drug use be-
comes increasingly impaired. How these drug-
induced alterations in motivational, attentional
and cognitive processes interact to produce the
compulsive patterns of drug-seeking and drug-
taking behavior that characterizes addiction re-
mains an important challenge for future
research.
Implications for therapy
In closing, we would like to point out that the
incentive–sensitization view of addiction has a
number of implications for therapy. First, it sug-
gests that pharmacotherapeutic approaches
which fail to address the neuroadaptive processes
that lead to addiction in the  rst place will
probably provide only symptomatic relief, and in
the long term will probably be of limited ef cacy.
For example, the treatment of withdrawal symp-
toms by themselves has proven to have little
effect in the long-term.18 We suggest that this is
because avoidance of withdrawal is not the fun-
damental motivating force in addiction. Thus,
the incentive–sensitization view of addiction pre-
dicts that the most ef cacious medications will
either (a) reverse the neuroadaptations that un-
derlie incentive–sensitization and/or (b) prevent
the expression of neural sensitization in behavior;
i.e. inhibit the output of a sensitized “wanting”
system.
There are, of course, many potential limita-
tions of drugs with such effects. For example, it
is not clear whether it is possible to develop an
agent that could reverse speci cally drug-experi-
ence dependent plasticity, without effecting
other forms of experience-dependent plasticity
that are probably very similar at the cell and
molecular level. Also, most human addicts are
polysubstance abusers, and it is not obvious
whether any single agent would be effective if
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different drugs of abuse induce different sensi-
tization-related neuroadaptations. Furthermore,
these pharmacotherapeutic approaches are not
likely to have long-term ef cacy in the absence of
psychotherapeutic and social supports that alter
life style. For example, a medication that re-
versed sensitization-related neuroadaptations
would not be effective if after treatment a person
resumed drug-taking, and reinitiated the sensi-
tization process. Nevertheless, the classes of
medications currently in use probably do not
directly attack the problem of reversing incen-
tive–sensitization.
Substitution approaches
Opiate addicts can be maintained for long peri-
ods of time by substitution of heroin or mor-
phine with long-acting mu opiate receptor
agonists, such as methadone or levo-alpha acetyl
methadyl (LAAM), and more recently by partial
agonists such as buprenorphine. This approach
has prompted interest in developing analogous
long-lasting substitutes for cocaine. Although
substitution therapies might be effective in man-
aging addictive disorders, it must be acknowl-
edged that they do not eliminate the addiction.
They simply substitute one addictive drug for
another that has more benign pharmacological
properties. These substitutes are themselves
chronically self-administered and may promote
the same neuroadaptive processes as the orig-
inally abused agent, thus maintaining the
strength of an addiction. There is certainly no
evidence that they can reverse neuroadaptive
processes, such as neural sensitization, that may
have produced addictive behavior in the  rst
place.
Antagonists
Antagonist therapies, such as naltrexone, have
different implications regarding the incentive–
sensitization theory. Antagonists that block opi-
oid receptors may suppress a component of
reinforcement involving “liking” as well as
“wanting”.3,33 Presumably, they might be effec-
tive in preventing the development of an addic-
tion, and may possibly also prevent the
re-boosting of incentive salience attributions that
would otherwise strengthen the addiction further
(for discussion of re-boosting and incentive
salience, see Berridge & Robinson19). However,
there is no reason to believe that opioid antago-
nists are capable of permanently reversing any of
the neuroadaptations in an addict that lead to
incentive sensitization, and so an individual may
still remain at risk to relapse.
Antidepressants
A variety of antidepressants have been used over
the years in the treatment of addiction, based in
part on the assumption they will reduce symp-
toms of depression (e.g. anhedonia) in with-
drawal, and that by itself should be useful in
treating addiction. For example, there were ini-
tially enthusiastic reports on using tricyclic an-
tidepressants, such as desipramine, in treating
cocaine dependence.197 However, later studies
suggested that the initial enthusiasm was not
warranted.197–199 Indeed, there have been reports
that tricyclics may in some instances actually
promote relapse.200 This may be because such
agents promote catecholamine neurotransmis-
sion, and this can “prime” drug responding (pro-
moting drug “wanting” from our point of view).
Indeed, repeated treatment with desipramine has
been reported to induce sensitization of do-
pamine neurotransmission.201 Obviously, from
an incentive–sensitization view, this would be
disadvantageous.
More recently, a different antidepressant,
bupropion (Wellbutrin), has been reported to
increase abstinence from cigarettes for smok-
ers.202,203 Bupropion is a monoamine uptake
blocker, and modulates both norepinephrine and
dopamine activity.204–206 However, bupropion
also increases the level of mRNA expression for
the dopamine transporter within the ventral teg-
mental area and substantia nigra.205 Increased
numbers of the transporter molecules after this
drug could facilitate re-uptake, and so exert a
suppressive effect on dopamine neurotransmis-
sion that would oppose the original re-uptake
blocking action207,208 (Dr K.Y. Little, personal
communication). If bupropion acts on craving
speci cally, rather than on general aspects of
depression that contribute to smoking behavior,
then suppression of dopamine neurotransmission
would be expected to be more useful than facili-
tation from our point of view.
Since smokers take the drug chronically, and
craving is affected over months, the long-term
effects of taking the drug are likely to be most
important to its therapeutic action. As with most
S108 Terry E. Robinson & Kent C. Berridge
antidepressants, the long-term effects of this
drug are least understood. However, as with
desipramine, there is evidence that repeated
treatment with bupropion can itself induce be-
havioral sensitization, and “bupropion-induced
behavioral sensitization is accompanied by a
selective potentiation of the effects of this com-
pound on interstitial dopamine concentrations in
the nucleus accumbens”209 (p. 7). If neural sen-
sitization occurs after therapeutic doses of
bupropion, then the incentive–sensitization the-
ory must certainly regard it as a less than ideal
drug for treating addiction.
Acamprosate
Acamprosate has been described as a “partial
co-agonist” for NMDA glutamate receptors,
although its effects on NMDA transmission
appear to be complex and possibly state-
dependent.210,211 Called an “anti-craving” drug,
it has been reported to increase the proportion of
alcoholics who successfully abstain from alcohol
for several months (although possibly not be-
yond212) and reduces some of the acute psycho-
logical and physiological consequences of alcohol
and morphine withdrawal.213,214 It is possible
that acamprosate might act in part by modulat-
ing the sensitized incentive salience of drug-
related stimuli. If acamprosate acts primarily on
NMDA receptors, if the location of those
NMDA receptors were in the mesoaccumbens
system or its major connections, and if NMDA
receptors are important mediators of the ex-
pression of neural sensitization,124 (124) then it
might conceivably interfere with an NMDA
mechanism involved in the expression of sensi-
tization. Clearly, however, this hinges on a num-
ber of assumptions, and so the relation between
acamprosate and the incentive–salience hypoth-
esis must remain unclear for the time being.
Immunotherapies
Finally, there recently has been interest in devel-
oping immunotherapies for cocaine abuse,18
which involve treatment with primary antibodies
or catalytic antibodies to cocaine. These treat-
ments effectively reduce the amount of cocaine
that reaches the brain. Of course, this approach
also fails to reverse the neuroadaptive processes
responsible for addiction, even though it may
impede their further growth. Because of this
failure to address persisting neural sensitization,
cocaine addicts treated with such vaccines may
still crave the drug. They might satisfy their
desire by either taking enough cocaine to over-
come the antibody, or by taking a different psy-
chostimulant, such as amphetamine, which is
not targeted by the vaccine. Indeed, one might
fear that such vaccines could exacerbate some of
the social problems associated with cocaine
abuse, such as spurring some individuals to com-
mit more crimes, because recidivist addicts
would require more money to obtain the addi-
tional cocaine needed to overcome the antibody.
Future pharmacotherapies
The ability of existing drugs to treat addiction
(other than perhaps substitution therapy) is far
from impressive. Success for anti-craving drugs
is typically measured as a modest increase in the
percentage of addicts who give up their drugs for
a few months, or even just a few weeks. For
several therapeutic drugs, such as some antide-
pressants, even this goal is often not reached.
Clearly, current drugs provide no magic bullet
drug therapy for addiction. So what are the
prospects for better drugs in the future?
The incentive sensitization theory does not
rule out the possibility of more effective drug
therapies, but it highlights that a pharmacologi-
cal “cure” for addiction is a dif cult task. Using
drugs to block the development of sensitization
should be effective, and in animals studies many
such dopaminergic and glutaminergic agents
have been identi ed.124 However, it is unlikely
that people would be willing to take such agents
before they become addicts, and so these are not
likely to be useful therapeutic tools. The optimal
approach presumably would be to reverse the
neural changes underlying sensitization in ad-
dicts. Given that sensitization appears to involve
complex changes in patterns of synaptic connec-
tivity in regions such as the nucleus accumbens
and prefrontal cortex and multiple biochemical
adaptations in monoamine and excitatory amino
acid neurotransmitter systems,122–124,128,129 it
seems unlikely that a pharmacological agent
could reverse all these neuroadaptations—and
possibly more—without disrupting other neural
processes necessary for normal brain function.
Also, as mentioned above, it is not clear whether
a single agent could target the multiple neuroad-
aptations likely to be associated with the poly-
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substance abuse typical of addicts. However,
these are empirical questions that will only be
answered by future research.
It might be more reasonable to hope to modu-
late the expression of neural sensitization, even if
one could not reverse it. A drug therapy that
acted to block the attribution of sensitized incen-
tive salience to drug-related stimuli and associ-
ated representations might well reduce addictive
craving and compulsive drug taking. Therapeutic
drugs that target the neural mechanisms involved
in the expression of sensitized incentive salience
may offer the best hope of pharmacotherapies for
addiction from the point of view of the incen-
tive–sensitization theory.124,125 It is even possible
that some current drugs, to the degree that they
target craving at all, might interact with neural
mechanisms that express sensitization. Future
therapeutic drugs might be developed to do this
better, especially when the mechanisms that ex-
press sensitized incentive salience are more fully
understood.
However, in developing such compounds the
incentive–sensitization theory posits that their
neural target must be the neural substrate re-
sponsible speci cally for sensitized incentive
salience, and it is not well established that this
substrate is the same as that responsible for
psychomotor sensitization.216,217 There may be
multiple neural systems sensitized by repeated
exposure to drugs of abuse that mediate different
behaviors, but according to incentive–
sensitzation theory only the neural substrate re-
sponsible for incentive salience (“wanting”) is
crucial in addiction. In developing preclinical
models it will be important to determine the
relationship between the sensitization of different
behaviors (e.g. locomotion, different stereo-
typies, self-administration, post-stereotypy hy-
peractivity, rotational behavior, etc.), and the
sensitization of different neural substrates. It will
also be important to identify which of these
substrates is most predictive of the sensitization
of incentive salience relevant to addiction.
Psychotherapies
To end on a positive note, the incentive–sensi-
tization theory suggests that in the absence of
effective pharmacotherapeutics and, despite the
persistence of neural sensitization, properly ap-
plied psychotherapeutic (including behavioral)
approaches may be effective in treating addic-
tion. They may offer the best hope for addicts
today. This is because environmental (and pre-
sumably psychological) factors can powerfully
modulate the expression and development of
sensitization, as discussed above.72,73 This sug-
gests that behavioral/cognitive mechanisms may
be employed to gate the output of the sensitized
neural systems mediating core motivational pro-
cesses, thus preventing their expression in behav-
ior. Sadly, the persistence of neural sensitization
may mean, to paraphrase Alcoholics Anony-
mous, that in a neurobiological sense once an
addict always an addict. But by developing effec-
tive long-term behavioral, cognitive and psycho-
social support structures one should be able to
manage more effectively the urges arising from
drug sensitized neural systems that mediate the
basic motivational processes discussed here.
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77. CASTAÑEDA, E., BECKER, J. B. & ROBINSON, T. E.
(1988) The long-term effects of repeated am-
phetamine treatment in vivo on amphetamine,
KCl and electrical stimulation evoked striatal
dopamine release in vitro, Life Sciences, 42, 2447–
2456.
78. HENRY, D. J. & WHITE, F. J. (1991) Repeated
cocaine administration causes persistent en-
hancement of D1 dopamine receptor sensitivity
within the rat nucleus accumbens, Journal of
Pharmacology and Experimental Therapeutics, 258,
882–890.
79. KANTOR, L., HEWLETT, G. H. & GNEGY, M. E.
(1999) Enhanced amphetamine- and K 1 -medi-
ated dopamine release in rat striatum after re-
peated amphetamine: differential requirements
for Ca2 1 - and calmodulin-dependent phos-
phorylation and synaptic vesicles, Journal of
Neuroscience, 19, 3801–3808.
80. ROBINSON, T. E. & BECKER, J. B. (1982) Behav-
ioral sensitization is accompanied by an enhance-
ment in amphetamine-stimulated dopamine
release from striatal tissue in vitro, European
Journal of Pharmacology, 85, 253–254.
81. VANDERSCHUREN , L. J., WARDEH, G., DE VRIES,
T. J., MULDER, A. H. & SCHOFFELMEER , A. N.
(1999) Opposing role of dopamine D1 and
D2 receptors in modulation of rat nucleus
accumbens noradrenaline release, Journal of
Neuroscience, 19, 4123–4131.
82. BADIANI, A., ANAGNOSTARAS , S. G. & ROBINSON,
T. E. (1995) The development of sensitization to
the psychomotor stimulant effects of am-
phetamine is enhanced in a novel environment,
Psychopharmacology, 117, 443–452.
83. BADIANI, A., BROWMAN, K. E. & ROBINSON, T. E.
(1995) In uence of novel versus home environ-
ments on sensitization to the psychomotor stimu-
lant effects of cocaine and amphetamine, Brain
Research, 674, 291–298.
84. BADIANI, A., CAMP, D. M. & ROBINSON, T. E.
(1997) Enduring enhancement of amphetamine
sensitization by drug-associated environmental
stimuli, Journal of Pharmacology and Experimental
Therapeutics, 282, 787–794.
85. CROMBAG, H. C., MUELLER, H., BROWMAN, K.
E., BADIANI, A. & ROBINSON, T. E. (1999) A
comparison of two behavioral measures of psy-
chomotor activation following intravenous
amphetamine or cocaine: dose- and sensitization-
dependent changes, Behavioural Pharmacology,
10, 205–213.
86. FRAIOLI, S., CROMBAG, H. S., BADIANI, A. &
ROBINSON, T. E. (1999) Susceptibility to am-
phetamine-induced locomotor sensitization is
modulated by environmental stimuli, Neuro-
psychopharmacology, 20, 533–541.
87. BADIANI, A., OATES, M. M., DAY, H. E. W.,
WATSON, S. J., AKIL, H. & ROBINSON, T. E.
(1998) Amphetamine-induced behavior, do-
pamine release, and c-fos mRNA expression:
modulation by environmental novelty, Journal of
Neuroscience, 18, 10579–10593.
88. BADIANI, A., OATES, M. M., DAY, H. E. W.,
WATSON, S. J., AKIL, H. & ROBINSON, T. E.
(1999) Environmental modulation of am-
phetamine-induced c-fos expression in D1 versus
D2 striatal neurons, Behavioural Brain Research,
103, 203–209.
89. SCHENK, S. & PARTRIDGE, B. (1997) Sensitiza-
tion and tolerance in psychostimulant self-
An incentive–sensitization view of addiction S113
administration, Pharmacology,Biochememistry and
Behavior, 57, 543–550.
90. HORGER, B. A., SHELTON, K. & SCHENK, S.
(1990) Preexposure sensitizes rats to the reward-
ing effects of cocaine, Pharmacology Biochemistry
and Behavior, 37, 707–711.
91. HORGER, B. A., GILES, M. K. & SCHENK, S.
(1992) Preexposure to amphetamine and nic-
otine predisposes rats to self-administer a low
dose of cocaine, Psychopharmacology, 107, 271–
276.
92. PIAZZA, P. V., DEMINIÈRE, J. M., LE MOAL, M. &
SIMON, H. (1989) Factors that predict individual
vulnerability to amphetamine self-administration,
Science, 245, 1511–1513.
93. PIAZZA, P. V., DEMINIÈRE, J. M., LE MOAL, M. &
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